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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the effect of infrastructures on cost and productivity performance of the
private productive sector of Spanish regions over the 1980-1993 period. We use a dual approach
based on cost functions that allows us to recover the usual parameters estimated with production
functions. In addition, we obtain rates of return and cost elasticities of production factors at the
regional level. Our framework considers explicitly that some factors are quasi-fixed and can be
away from their optimal endowment levels. Our results indicate that the public sector has
contributed significantly to enhance productivity and reduce costs in the private sector of almost
every Spanish region. Nevertheless, there is still scope for the government to continue its
investment efforts, given that it remains a sensible gap between existing and optimal public
capital, and that we find that public capital promotes private investment in the long run.
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1. Introduction.
Stimulated by the research carried out by Aschauer (1988, 1989a and b), many
economists have analyzed the relationship between public investment in infrastructures
and output, productivity and profitability in the private sector. The results obtained for
the American private sector drew the economists’ attention to this kind of literature
because of the quantitative importance of infrastructures. According to Aschauer
estimates of a Cobb-Douglas production function, a 1% increase in infrastructures
expenditure meant an increase of 0.24 to 0.39% in the output of the private sector.
Munnell (1990) confirmed the magnitude of these figures by making use of a similar
sample, although the impact of infrastructures on productivity was reduced almost to
1/3 when using panel data techniques for the American states. Later studies such as
Garcia-Mila’s, McGuire and Porter’s (1996) and Holtz-Eakin’s (1994) have questioned
the effect of infrastructures on productivity, pointing out some problems of econometric
nature
1, and arriving at results which were totally different to those of Aschauer’s.
Nevertheless, studies on the Spanish economy reveal some more optimistic results. In
short, not only the analyses of the impact of infrastructures carried out with annual data
by means of the estimation of production functions
2, but also those papers that used
panel data for the Spanish regions
3 have always obtained a positive impact of
infrastructures for the whole Spanish economy.
Despite the fact that there is lot of research, which either supports or refutes the
early conclusions Aschauer came to (see the surveys by Gramlich (1994), Draper and
Herce (1994), de la Fuente (1996) and Sanaú (1997)), it seems pointless to conclude
that public capital is not productive. So it can be argued that in a debate of this kind it is
worthwhile trying for the Spanish case an alternative approach, which does not focus on
the estimation of production functions. The idea is to allow for a more flexible
relationship between public and private capital than the one implied in the Cobb-
                                                          
1 Problems of endogeneity, non-stationarity, omission of variables, measurement error, etc.
2 See Bajo and Sosvilla (1993), Argimón et al. (1994), Mas et al. (1993) and Serra and Garcia-Fontes
(1994).
3 See Mas et al. (1993), Serra and García-Fontes (1994) and Dabán and Murgui (1997).2
Douglas technology
4. In addition, we will take advantage of the analytical framework
provided by duality theory by means of processing relevant information about input and
output prices, and allowing the use of technological and behavioral restrictions.
In this paper we will make use of a dual approach based on cost functions (see
Diewert (1986)), that has been already used for the analysis of the Swedish economy
(see Berndt and Hansson (1992)), the German economy (see Conrad and Seitz (1992)
and Seitz (1994)), the English economy (see Lynde and Richmond (1993a)), the
American economy (see Morrison and Schwartz (1992 and 1996), Lynde and Richmond
(1993b) and Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994)) and the Spanish economy (see Moreno,
López-Bazo and Artís (1998), and Boscá, Dabán and Escribá (1999)). The specific
functional form for the variable cost function we have chosen is a Generalized Leontief
(see Morrison (1988)) which incorporates more-than-one fixed factor, nonconstant
returns to scale, and allows for any degree of complementarity or substitutability
between fixed and flexible inputs.
The impact of public infrastructures on output and production costs of the
private productive sector of the Spanish regions will be analyzed using annual data for
the 1980-93 period, that are taken from the BD.MORES database elaborated at the
Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance
5. Our results confirm the relevance of using
a theoretical framework that is flexible enough to consider the existence of quasi-fixed
factors, which may not be used in their most efficient combination, and that allows to
analyze explicitly the effects of infrastructure investment on private capital
accumulation. The results indicate that the public sector has contributed significantly to
enhance productivity and reduce costs in the private productive sector of almost every
Spanish region. Nevertheless, there is still scope for the government to continue its
investment efforts, given that it remains a sensible gap between effective and optimal
public capital, and that we find that public capital promotes private investment in the
long run.
                                                          
4 The Cobb-Douglas form has been used more than any in the literature based on production functions,
although it imposes rigid restrictions about inputs substitutability as Berndt and Hansson (1992) or
Morrison and Schwartz (1992) have pointed out.
5 See Dabán et al. (1998) for a description of the series included and the methodology employed to
construct this database, that is available writing to the following e-mail address: adiaz-
ballesteros@igae.meh.es3
The article is structured into five sections. Section 1 is an introduction. Section 2
presents the theoretical model and its empirical specification. Section 3 presents a brief
description of the data and some interesting facts about the evolution of the private
sector in the Spanish regions. Section 4 presents our main results evaluating the impact
of infrastructures both in the short as in the long term. Our final section deals with the
most important conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework.
Assume that intermediate inputs (M) and labor (L) are variable inputs, and that private
capital (KP) is a quasi-fixed factor in the short run. Firms, which cannot decide on its
volume, are supplied with free services of public capital (KG). So, the production
function may be written as follows:
) , , , ( ) ( G P K K M L f t A Y = (1)
 where Y is output, A(t) represents the variable efficiency level and f is an homogeneous
function of degree λ  in L, M, KP and KG. Under competitive conditions, being w and v
the price of labor and intermediate inputs respectively, the short run variable cost
function G(•) can be written as follows
6:
) , , ,   , , ( t K K Y v G G G P ω = (2)
Total cost (C) will be the result of adding the fixed cost of private capital
( P K K P
P ⋅ ) to the variable costs, i.e.
P K G P K P t K K Y v G C
P + = ) , , ,   , , (ω (3)
where 
P K P  is the user cost of private capital. The firm does not incur any cost for the
use of the fixed amount of infrastructures supplied by the public sector, so that these
play the role of a positive externality for the individual firm. Notice that this cost
                                                          
6 The variable cost function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, continuous, monotonically
non-decreasing and concave in prices.4
function can be obtained from the minimization of private production costs,  M v L + ω ,
subject to the production function (1). Applying Shephard’s Lemma we can obtain the
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Further, differentiating the cost function (2) with respect to public capital, we
obtain the shadow value of public capital (






















which decomposes the cost changes associated with an increase in KG into adjustment
effects on private labor and intermediate inputs. LKG  denotes the response of the
optimal demand for labor, and MKG the response of the optimal demand for
intermediate inputs, to an increase in infrastructures. As a consequence, for example,
LKG positive (negative) means that infrastructures and labor are substitutes
(complements), given that an increase in public capital reduces (increases) labor costs.
In order to assess properly the impact of the provision of public capital on cost
and productivity performance of firms it is convenient to translate the shadow price of






















G K S  is the shadow share of public capital in total cost and 
G K C, ε  is the cost
elasticity of public capital. Notice that we can also translate our LKG and MKG  measures
into the corresponding elasticities (
G K L, ε  and 
G K M , ε ).
A similar reasoning, although with some modifications, can be applied to private
capital. Given that we consider private capital to be a quasi-fixed factor, its shadow
price may be defined analogous to the public capital shadow price as the reduction in5
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P K Z  represents then the marginal benefit of investing in private
capital. If the shadow price is positive, it means that an increase in private capital is cost
saving for the firm, either because all variable inputs are substitutes with respect to
private capital or because the substitutive effects upon private capital and some variable
inputs outweigh the existing complementary effects. As before, we can translate the
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However, in the case of private capital, given that it is a choice variable for the
firm, an increase in private capital produces a direct cost (the user cost of capital) that
has to be compared with the cost-saving benefit measured by the shadow price of
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If the shadow price is positive and higher than the user cost (i.e. the marginal
benefit of investment is higher than the marginal cost), the cost elasticity will be
negative, reflecting that the existing stock of capital is below its optimal level. In other
words, the optimal demand for private capital in the long run will be that which fulfills
P P K K Z P = , because when 
P K Z  is higher than 
P K P , firms will require higher levels of
private capital, given that the cost-saving benefits of an additional unit of capital
outweigh the cost of investment.
Thus, we can assess the impact of the provision of public capital on the cost and
productive performance of firms in two situations. First, when the private capital stock
diverges from the optimal one, i.e. in the short run equilibrium. Second, when we
impose that firms have adjusted their capital levels to the long run equilibrium, i.e.6
when we impose
7 that 
P P K K Z P = . Then the optimal capital stock (KP
*) can be expressed
as
) , , , , , ( * t K Y P v w h K G K P P = (9)
and replacing it in equation (3), we obtain the long run cost function
8:
() () ( )
() t K Y P v w K P
t K Y t K Y P v w K v G t K Y P v w C
G K P K






, , , , ,






From equation (9) we can derive an elasticity measure of the impact of public
capital on the optimal private capital stock ( KG KP* ε ), under the assumption that there are
no adjustment costs. In addition, consequently with equation (10) we can reconsider the
short run shadow value of public capital and the corresponding short run elasticities and
convert them into long run measures.
Finally, although we are assuming that public capital is an external factor that
private firms can not influence, we can derive different measures for the optimal public
capital stock, under the assumption that the government would minimize firms short run
total costs. Thus, if we assume different values for the user cost of public capital (
G K P )
we can compute the optimal public capital stock as
9
) , , , , , ( * t K Y P v w h K P K G G = (11)
As mentioned above, we have chosen a Generalized Leontief variable cost
function to estimate the parameters needed to calculate the shadow values and
elasticities shown in previous paragraphs. The specification of the Leontief function is
                                                          
7 Notice that 
P P K K Z P = , is the first order condition that results from minimizing equation (3) of short run
total costs with respect to Kp.
8 See Schankerman and Nadiri (1986), and Kulatilaka (1985).
9 In our framework public capital is an unpaid input for the firm, so that a positive 
G K Z  implies always
that the firm desires more public investment in infrastructures. Nevertheless, the government should take
into account the social costs of infrastructures, i.e.  ≠
G K P  0, to assess properly its impact on private sector
performance.7
the same as in Morrison (1988) which incorporates fixed inputs and does not impose the
degree of returns to scale. It can be expressed as
10
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where Pi and Pj denote the prices of variable inputs V i, xk and xl are the quasi-fixed
inputs (KP and KG); and sm and sn denote the remaining arguments (Y and t). Using
Shephard’s lemma, we get the two input demand equations for the variable inputs
11 that
we can write as
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Following Morrison and Schwarz (1996) we add to the previous system of three
equations a fourth one that captures firms profit maximization behavior. This equation
is a short run pricing equation that equates the price of output (PY) to the marginal cost
(MC). It has to be emphasized that such a condition is not being imposed but estimated,
so that the residual of this equation may capture the extent to which regions have some
market power.
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10 Notice that we are employing almost the same notation as in Morrison and Schwarz (1996).
11 To accommodate heteroscedasticity we will estimate equations (12) and (13) divided by output (Y).8
The previous system of four equations will be estimated to obtain the relevant
parameters of the cost function, that we will use to calculate the shadow prices,
elasticities and other relevant measures for the analysis of the effect of infrastructures.
3. The Data.
The basic data for the seventeen Spanish regions are taken from the BD.MORES
database. The level of regional disaggregation correspond to NUTS2 in Eurostat
nomenclature of statistical territorial units (see Dabán et al. (1998)). This database
allows us to assemble series of gross value added
12, gross earnings of private
employees, number of employees, public and private capital stocks
13, user costs of
private and public capital and the necessary price indices for the period 1980-1993. The
series of intermediate inputs and their price indices are taken from Díaz (1998), and are
fully compatible with BD.MORES data. The output measure used in this paper is gross
output, which results from adding intermediate inputs to gross value added.
Table 1 presents the evolution of the main economic magnitudes for the private
sector in the whole of the Spanish economy. The first column corresponds to gross
output, which shows the cyclical pattern of the Spanish economy. Labor and
intermediate inputs are clearly pro-cyclical, presenting average negative rates of growth
from 1980 to 1985 and positive rates of growth from 1985 onwards.
Differences in growth rates among the productive factors are important. For the
period as a whole public capital displays the highest annual average growth rate (4.9%),
followed by private capital (2.4%) and intermediate inputs (2.0%), whereas on average
employment remained almost constant. Nevertheless, it is clear that during the 1980-85
crisis, the growth rates of output and productive factors (except infrastructures) were
very low, being even negative for employment and intermediate inputs. The economic
                                                          
12 Gross value added includes production of goods and services at factor costs, produced in the region, by
the private productive sectors: agriculture (forestry and fishing), industry (mining, manufacturing,
construction and utilities) and private services (commerce, transport, and communications, banking and
other private services). Housing rents are excluded.
13 Private capital data refer to the net stock of capital held by the productive private sector. Thus, it does
neither include the stock of residential buildings, nor the stock in productive infrastructures. Public capital
data refer to the net stock of productive infrastructure. It comprises transportation networks, energy
supply networks, water supply and sewage systems. They may be offered by government or government
agencies, by regulated private or public enterprises, and by public or private organizations.9
expansion experienced in Spain from 1986 to 1992 is also apparent in the figures, being
quite noticeable the rates of growth of infrastructures in these years.








YK P KG LM
1980 22520 21259 3192 10054 10554
1981 21857 21699 3243 9701 9990
1982 21984 22037 3360 9546 10017
1983 22316 22362 3482 9448 10138
1984 22600 22557 3575 9157 10205
1985 22798 22682 3720 9258 10117
1986 23695 23003 3891 9359 10632
1987 25081 23581 4069 9750 11287
1988 26564 24384 4298 10053 12071
1989 28052 25453 4630 10330 12906
1990 29125 26496 5053 10654 13441
1991 29729 27497 5452 10690 13758
1992 29775 28395 5761 10441 13794
1993 29316 28799 5927 10031 13507
Average Annual Growth
Rate 1980-93 (%) 2,085 2,370 4,898 0,018 1,979
1980-85 (%) 0,259 1,306 3,116 -1,623 -0,815
1986-93 (%) 3,226 3,035 6,012 1,044 3,725
Note: Figures are in thousands of millions 1980 pesetas, except labor that is in thousands of
employees.
In table 2 we present information about regional disparities in the same
economic variables analyzed before. Asturias is the region that has the lowest rate of
growth in output, employment and intermediate inputs. Madrid, on the other hand,
displays high growth rates of output and all productive factors. Infrastructures have
grown in all regions at a higher rate than private capital (with the exceptions of La Rioja
and Navarre), showing the important investment effort carried out by Spanish federal or
local governments.
The last column of table 2 shows the weight of the private sector of each region
in Spanish total gross output. As can be appreciated only five regions produce 63% of10
gross output of the private sector in Spain (Catalonia (20%), Madrid (13%), Andalusia
(13%), Valencia (9%) and Basque Country (8%)).
Table 2. Regional disparities in the private sector.
Y ˆ
P K ˆ




Andalusia 2,00 2,28 7,58 0,05 1,77 0,13
Aragon 2,75 1,74 2,52 -0,15 2,99 0,04
Asturias 0,42 1,84 4,63 -1,42 0,26 0,03
Baleares 2,93 2,15 4,60 0,59 2,91 0,02
Canary Islands 2,64 2,76 3,67 0,56 2,51 0,03
Cantabria 1,93 1,23 6,04 -1,33 2,01 0,02
Castile and Leon 1,88 1,63 3,10 -1,06 1,96 0,07
Castile-La Mancha 1,67 2,30 4,51 -0,32 1,40 0,03
Catalonia 2,27 2,64 4,27 0,22 2,07 0,20
Valencia 1,77 2,94 5,64 0,41 1,89 0,09
Extremadura 2,89 1,65 4,94 -0,77 2,92 0,02
Galicia 1,60 2,16 3,95 -1,24 1,62 0,06
Madrid 2,57 3,60 5,91 1,30 2,23 0,13
Murcia 2,00 2,31 8,46 0,68 1,63 0,02
Navarre 2,39 2,82 2,45 0,31 2,62 0,02
Basque Country 1,05 0,97 4,12 -0,39 0,99 0,08
La Rioja 2,26 2,66 0,13 -0,21 2,21 0,01
Note: Average annual growth rates, 1980-1993.
Finally, figure 1 shows the relative position of each region in relation to the
national average in terms of the ratio of public to private capital and of public capital to
output. It is obvious that there are again considerable disparities among the Spanish
regions. La Rioja and Navarre are the regions with the highest ratio of public to private
capital, and together with Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Canary Islands,
Asturias, Aragon, Basque Country and Andalusia are over the national average. On the
other hand, it is worthwhile pointing out the low endowment of public capital in relation
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Figure 1. Ratios of public capital to output and private capital.
1980-93 averages.
14
4. Results for the Spanish private sector.
We have estimated equations (12), (13) and (14) using seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) techniques. Estimation was carried out using annual data from 1980 to 1993 for
the 17 Spanish regions. This procedure allows us to impose the theoretical restrictions
that derive from Shephard’s lemma, while gaining degrees of freedom in the estimation.
Furthermore, estimating the model as a system adds structure and increases efficiency
of the estimates (standard errors are lower). As is well known, the usual practice in this
kind of literature is to impose the theoretical cross-equation restrictions, without
presenting formal tests that give statistical support to them. Usually, this is justified only
as a way of obtaining reasonable results from an economic point of view. Nevertheless,
in table A.1 in the appendix we present the parameter estimates from our preferred
specification, along with two different specification tests.
On the one hand, Shankerman and Nadiri (1986) elaborated a specific
econometric test to investigate the divergence of quasi-fixed factors from their static
equilibrium levels. The hypothesis to be tested is whether the parameters obtained from
                                                          
14  Key to region names: AND=Andalusia; ARA= Aragon; AST= Asturias; BAL= Baleares; CAN=
Canary Islands; CANT= Cantabria; CYL= Castile and León; CLM= Castile-La Mancha; CAT=
Catalonia; VAL= Valencia; GAL= Galicia; EXT= Extremadura; MAD= Madrid; MUR= Murcia; NAV=
Navarre; PV= Basque Country; RIO= La Rioja.12
the estimate of the short run specification, coincide with those which are obtained from
the estimate of the first order condition 
P P K K P Z = . Intuitively, if private capital is at its
optimal level the coefficients estimated from the equation representing optimal capital
endowment, will coincide with the coefficients estimated from the model where private
capital is assumed to be a quasi-fixed factor and consequently away from its static
equilibrium. As can be seen in table A.1, the hypothesis that private capital is close to
its static equilibrium level is strongly rejected
15. The conclusion is that the stock of
private capital cannot be found at the optimal level, and therefore it must be considered
when specifying the model as a quasi-fixed factor.
The previous conclusion is reinforced when considering the result we get from
testing the parameter restrictions implied by Shephard’s lemma. As can be seen in table
A.1, it is possible to accept the null hypothesis that labor and intermediate inputs are at
their optimal demand levels
16. If we instead specify the model assuming that private
capital is another flexible input, so that we add a third input demand equation, the
parameter restrictions implied by Shephard’s lemma are strongly rejected. This implies
that Shephard’s lemma can only be verified if we assume that private capital behaves as
a quasi-fixed factor in the short term, which is coherent with the results of the
Shankerman and Nadiri test. This is potentially an important result, because it is
common practice in the duality literature to impose the restrictions derived from
Shephard’s Lemma and/or to assume private capital being a flexible or a quasi-fixed
input, despite the fact that the implied restrictions are verified by means of formal
                                                          
15 This result is similar to the one which Moreno, López Bazo and Artís (1998) obtained for the
manufacturing branches in Spanish regions.
16 The dummy variables included in the equations are very important to get this result. In fact, if the
model is estimated with none of these variables, the test rejects the null hypothesis ((χ
2(32)=48.42, P-
Value = 0.031). We tried also to estimate a fixed effects model, incorporating regional–specific intercept
terms in both input demand equations. Nevertheless, this means incorporating 17x4 additional cross-
equation restrictions to the system, that are strongly rejected by statistical tests. In addition, the imposition
of those restrictions alters considerably the values obtained for the rest of the coefficients. This casts
serious doubts on the plausibility of these results, so that we finally decided to pick up regional
heterogeneity by introducing only two dummy variables. The first dummy takes the value one in
Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Murcia and zero in the rest, and the second takes the value one in
Castile-La Mancha. Extremadura, Castilla-León, Navarre, Rioja and Cantabria and zero in the rest. These
two groups have been chosen because regions in the first group display very low  Y KG  and  P G K K
ratios compared to the national average. Additionally, those regions have a considerable weight in the
output of the Spanish private sector. The second set of regions follows an opposite pattern.13
econometric tests. In our case common practice and econometric tests go in the same
direction, making us quite confident that our model specification points into the right
direction.
As mentioned before, the estimated coefficients in the specification finally
chosen are shown in table A.1 in the appendix. Overall, the fit of the four equations is
high and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, although the sign
17 and
magnitude of them has little intuitive value from an economic viewpoint given the
complexity of the cost function used. The shadow values, elasticities and other
measures of cost and productive performance discussed in the theoretical section have
been obtained from the estimates presented in table A.1, and are summarized in tables 3,
4 and 5.
As can be seen in table 3, where we present results for the whole of the Spanish
private sector
18, the shadow price of private capital (col. 2) shows an upward trend
throughout the period, with the user cost (col. 1) fluctuating around it. This means that
for the economy as a whole, the stock of private capital has not been persistently away
from its long run equilibrium level
19. The average 
P K Z  measure means that a 1-million
1980 pesetas investment in private capital results in 112.000 pesetas cost saving for one
year. From these the average region saves 190.000 pesetas in intermediate inputs
(col.4), while it spends 79.000 additional pesetas in the labor input (col.3). As a
consequence, the negative LKP means that private capital and labor are complements,
while the positive MKP measure implies a substitutive relationship between intermediate
inputs and private capital.
                                                          
17 Nevertheless, the sign of certain coefficients need to be consistent with the so-called curvature
conditions (see Diewert and Wales (1987) or Morrison and Schwarz (1994)). In our case, the condition
that  ∑ kk γ > 0 was not satisfied, so that we imposed that  ∑ kk γ = 0.40, which is accepted at conventional
significance levels. The reason to impose that the sum of the two implied coefficients is 0.40, is that this
value is among all the positive values which are statistically acceptable the most “conservative” one, in
the sense that it generates levels of  *
P K closer to the observed levels of  P K .
18 If not stated otherwise the average results for the whole Spanish economy are computed as non-
weighted regional averages.
19 Recall that, as Kulatilaka (1985) points out, the counterpart that the shadow price does not coincide
with the user cost is that the optimal capital stock does not coincide with the effective one.14
Table 3. Shadow prices in the private sector.
Years PKP ZKP LKP MKP ZKG LKG MKG
Regional averages [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1980 0,043 0,062 -0,109 0,171 0,321 0,264 0,057
1981 0,079 0,072 -0,089 0,162 0,370 0,213 0,157
1982 0,099 0,080 -0,078 0,158 0,367 0,184 0,183
1983 0,089 0,090 -0,075 0,166 0,365 0,176 0,190
1984 0,126 0,102 -0,071 0,175 0,358 0,168 0,189
1985 0,110 0,113 -0,068 0,181 0,325 0,150 0,177
1986 0,127 0,112 -0,074 0,183 0,287 0,168 0,132
1987 0,156 0,120 -0,080 0,196 0,261 0,194 0,084
1988 0,132 0,125 -0,083 0,205 0,249 0,216 0,048
1989 0,146 0,133 -0,083 0,212 0,219 0,223 0,015
1990 0,157 0,138 -0,081 0,216 0,183 0,214 -0,012
1991 0,146 0,142 -0,079 0,217 0,153 0,199 -0,026
1992 0,155 0,143 -0,072 0,213 0,143 0,175 -0,014
1993 0,113 0,143 -0,061 0,203 0,137 0,139 0,012
Average 0,120 0,112 -0,079 0,190 0,267 0,192 0,085
Standard deviation
1 0,0044 0,0045 0,0077 0,0208 0,0225 0,0323
Note: All figures are expressed in 1980 constant pesetas. 
1Standard deviation of the sample mean.
With regard to the shadow price of public capital (col. 5), 
G K Z  shows a clear
decreasing trend. The high values in the first years reveal the scarcity of infrastructures
in the Spanish economy at the beginning of the eighties. Nevertheless, the declining
pattern of the gross return to public capital indicates that the government has
contributed significantly to reduce the existing gap between optimal and existing public
capital. Finally, columns 6 and 7 provide additional information about the distribution
of the cost saving benefits of infrastructures investment. Public capital reduces private
cost through a reduction of expenditure in intermediate inputs until 1990 and through
the reduction of labor cost. Most noticeable is the fact that while private capital and
labor are complements, infrastructures and labor seem to be substitutes.
In table 4 we can find similar information as in table 3, but at the regional level.
There are important regional disparities, for example, the shadow price of private capital
(col. 2) is on average higher than the user cost (col. 1) in Andalusia, Castilla-León,
Catalonia, Valencia, Madrid, Navarre, Basque Country and La Rioja. Thus, as it has
been already argued, this implies that in these regions effective private capital has been
on average below its optimal level. It is noticeable that from these eight regions, seven15
out of them are the ones with more weight in Spanish total gross output (jointly these
regions represent more than 70 per cent of private production). This is the reason why
the non-weighted average of the elasticity of cost to private capital (col. 3) is positive,
while the same elasticity is negative for the whole Spain (constructed weighting
regional relative cost shares). This is an important result, because additional private
investment efforts in the regions with more weight in Spanish output will have benefited
the firms in these regions through the reduction of production costs. In contrast, the nine
regions with positive cost elasticities and consequently where effective private capital
has been on average above the optimal one, represent less than 30 per cent of total
output. In columns 4 and 5 we can find further information of the impact of private
capital on the cost performance of private firms in Spanish regions. In all the regions,
except in Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura, additional private capital endowments
result in labor costs increases (col. 4). Also with the exception of Extremadura, private
capital reduces costs through the substitution of intermediate inputs (col. 5). Summing
up in almost every Spanish region private capital and labor are complements while
intermediate inputs and private capital are substitutes.
With regard to the shadow price of public capital (col. 6), as expected it is
positive in all regions, with the exceptions of Castile and Leon and La Rioja
20, showing
the productive effect of infrastructures and the benefit in terms of cost reductions to
private firms. Given that we are assuming that infrastructures are supplied freely,
private firms do not face a user cost, so that the elasticity of cost to public capital (col.
7) is negative in the fifteen regions where 
G K Z  is positive.
                                                          
20 The fact that shadow prices of public capital in Castile and Leon and La Rioja are negative falls into
incoherence from a theoretical point of view. However, La Rioja displays an unusual pattern because of
its very high initial ratios of public to private capital and public capital to output, and because it is the
only region where public capital has almost not grown along the sample period.16
Table 4. Shadow prices and cost elasticities. Average values, 1980-93.
PKP ZKP εεεε C,KP εεεε L,KP εεεε M,KP ZKG εεεε C,KG εεεε L,KG εεεε M,KG
Regions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Andalusia 0,118 0,159 -0,044 0,139 -0,461 0,041 -0,001 -0,222 0,176
Aragon 0,119 0,093 0,030 0,167 -0,353 0,230 -0,054 0,002 -0,109
Asturias 0,121 0,103 0,017 0,325 -0,413 0,223 -0,040 -0,066 -0,033
Baleares 0,119 0,009 0,128 0,196 -0,197 0,931 -0,125 -0,039 -0,239
Canary Islands 0,117 0,114 0,003 0,255 -0,484 0,184 -0,043 -0,018 -0,076
Cantabria 0,123 0,043 0,085 0,275 -0,296 0,534 -0,091 0,026 -0,200
Castile and Leon 0,118 0,148 -0,036 0,190 -0,494 -0,038 0,010 -0,074 0,078
Castile-La Mancha 0,112 0,086 0,042 -0,068 -0,244 0,161 -0,048 0,153 -0,224
Catalonia 0,127 0,184 -0,052 0,138 -0,448 0,030 -0,004 -0,305 0,231
Valencia 0,123 0,141 -0,019 0,176 -0,429 0,156 -0,025 -0,167 0,079
Extremadura 0,111 0,011 0,192 -0,413 0,338 0,540 -0,137 0,267 -0,574
Galicia 0,115 0,104 0,011 0,152 -0,354 0,283 -0,050 -0,099 -0,021
Madrid 0,130 0,149 -0,015 0,213 -0,436 0,388 -0,036 -0,224 0,125
Murcia 0,115 0,037 0,086 0,196 -0,221 0,819 -0,107 -0,030 -0,187
Navarre 0,124 0,169 -0,041 0,425 -0,562 0,051 -0,012 -0,016 -0,012
Basque Country 0,128 0,145 -0,017 0,244 -0,449 0,144 -0,024 -0,157 0,067
La Rioja 0,118 0,217 -0,084 0,667 -0,667 -0,169 0,058 0,062 0,062
Average 0,120 0,112 0,017 0,193 -0,363 0,267 -0,043 -0,053 -0,050
Spain
1 -0,011 0,171 -0,411 -0,028 -0,153 0,063
Standard deviation
2 0,004 0,005 0,014 0,015 0,021 0,004 0,009 0,012
Notes: 
1The elasticities for Spain are obtained as weighted averages, taken as weights the ratios of the regional value of the variable to the national value.
2Standard deviation of the sample mean.17
The relationship between public capital and labor and intermediate inputs is also
shown in the last two columns of table 4. Public capital and labor are substitutes in most
regions (except in Aragon, Cantabría, Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura), contrasting
sharply with the complementary relationship among labor and private capital shown
before. Finally, there are important regional disparities in the relationship between
infrastructures and intermediate inputs. Both factors are substitutes in ten regions and
complements in seven. The important fact is that these seven regions are again the
biggest ones, which represent jointly more than 70 per cent of Spanish gross output.
This explains that the simple regional average of the elasticity of public capital to
intermediate inputs takes a negative value (-0.050), while the Spain measure (the
weighted average) is positive (0.063).
In table 5 we translate our cost performance measures into output elasticities and
returns to scale measures. Our results for the whole of the Spanish economy seem quite
reasonable, indicating that the estimation of cost functions may be appropriate to
analyze the productive effects of quasi-fixed inputs. With regard to output elasticities
21,
table 5 shows that the values for the whole of the Spanish private productive sector are
12.7% for private capital and 2.6% for public infrastructures. Given that our output
measure is gross output, these elasticities would be around 23% for private capital and
9% for public capital, if the variable considered were gross value added. As before there
are also significant differences across regions, that confirm the regional pattern that
emerges from the analysis of previous results
22. Finally, the last two columns of table 5
show information about short run returns to variable inputs and long run returns to
scale
23. For the average region, returns to scale are almost constant ( ≈
LR λ  0,97),
although firms are producing not only over the minimum of their average variable costs,
                                                          

















ε ≡ , where  Y C, ε  is the short run elasticity of total cost to output.
22 In most Spanish regions the values of the output elasticities are quite reasonable, although there are a
few exceptions.
23 Short run returns to variable inputs are defined as the ratio of average variable costs to marginal costs,
while long run returns are obtained adding the output elasticities of the four productive inputs.18
but also over the minimum of total costs in the short term ( ≈
SR λ  0,83). In this case,
regional disparities in the degree of short or long run returns are not as important as in
other indicators, indicating a quite reasonable pattern of the Spanish private sector:
regions operate under constant returns to scale, but with decreasing returns to variable
factors in the short run.
Table 5. Output elasticities and returns to scale. Average values, 1980-93.
εεεε Y,KP εεεε Y,KG λλλλ
SR λλλλ
LR
Regions [1] [2] [3] [4]
Andalusia 0,159 0,001 0,819 0,975
Aragon 0,107 0,053 0,840 0,991
Asturias 0,092 0,039 0,871 0,993
Baleares 0,008 0,108 0,749 0,841
Canary Islands 0,118 0,040 0,814 0,940
Cantabria 0,041 0,084 0,807 0,951
Castile and Leon 0,160 -0,010 0,810 0,997
Castile-La Mancha 0,138 0,049 0,842 1,002
Catalonia 0,162 0,004 0,848 0,988
Valencia 0,135 0,024 0,825 0,969
Extremadura 0,009 0,158 0,913 1,017
Galicia 0,106 0,049 0,858 1,014
Madrid 0,103 0,032 0,795 0,931
Murcia 0,036 0,102 0,835 0,933
Navarre 0,136 0,011 0,808 0,968
Basque Country 0,127 0,022 0,814 0,981
La Rioja 0,165 -0,051 0,806 0,913
Average 0,106 0,042 0,827 0,965
Spain
1 0,127 0,026 0,828 0,972
Standard deviation
2 0,0043 0,0036 0,0028 0,0030
Notes: 
1The elasticities for Spain are obtained as weighted averages, taken as weights the ratios of the regional value
of the variable to the national value. 
2Standard deviation of the sample mean.
The analysis in previous paragraphs has a short run nature, in the sense that it
has not taken into account the existence of an indirect effect of public capital on the
desired stock of private capital. In other words, the possible complementary or
substitutable relationship between public infrastructures and private capital can be
further investigated. As shown in the theoretical section, we can determine the stock of19
optimal private capital by means of equation (9), given the amount of infrastructures. In
the first column of table 6 we present the ratio of optimal to effective private capital.
Regional disparities in this indicator are the same as the ones presented in previous
tables, namely the biggest regions show on average a relative shortage of private capital,
while the smallest regions had effective private capital above optimal one. Again, the
simple and the weighted regional averages reflect this fact.
Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of the shadow price of private capital and its
user cost, as well as the stock of optimal capital and the existing one for the whole
Spanish private sector. As can be appreciated both figures are mirror images. There
have been not remarkable discrepancies between optimal and effective capital stock
from 1980 to 1988, although from 1988 to the end of the sample period there has been
persistent over-utilization of production capacity.
As stated before, the optimal stock of private capital depends on the endowment
of public capital, so we can study the relationship that exists between them. Actually, it
is very interesting to calculate the effect of an increase in infrastructures on the optimal
private capital stock. Column 2 of table 6 shows the average value of the elasticity of
optimal private capital to public infrastructures for each region. In all of them and
throughout the whole period both factors are complements ( KG KP* ε >0). Thus,
infrastructures generate a positive impact on the shadow price of private capital, and as
a result they help promoting new investment in private capital in the long run.
Assuming that firms in each region have reached the optimal private capital
stock, the next step is to calculate the shadow price of public capital in this situation. As
can be seen in column 3, the long run shadow price of public capital is positive in all the
regions, with especially high values in Madrid, Murcia, Baleares, Catalonia and
Valencia. The gross return to infrastructures is consequently high in most regions,
reflecting the fact that there is still scope for the Spanish local or federal government to
continue its investment efforts to alleviate the scarcity of infrastructures in the long run.
The same conclusion can be obtained looking at the cost elasticity to public capital (col.
4), which is negative in all regions, and does not present important disparities across big
and small regions.20
Table 6. Long run elasticities.
P P K K













Regions [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Andalusia 1,239 0,638 0,201 -0,038 -0,170 0,053 0,037 0,154
Aragon 0,882 0,866 0,130 -0,032 -0,031 -0,045 0,030 0,117
Asturias 0,827 1,178 0,118 -0,018 -0,154 0,042 0,016 0,083
Baleares 0,510 0,904 0,353 -0,042 -0,194 0,016 0,039 0,057
Canary Islands 0,985 0,768 0,174 -0,041 -0,024 -0,067 0,038 0,117
Cantabria 0,611 1,187 0,160 -0,024 -0,130 0,004 0,021 0,073
Castile and Leon 1,196 0,856 0,089 -0,025 -0,017 -0,040 0,023 0,156
Castile-La Mancha 0,916 0,787 0,071 -0,024 0,123 -0,185 0,022 0,168
Catalonia 1,280 0,547 0,279 -0,037 -0,260 0,132 0,038 0,149
Valencia 1,087 0,612 0,230 -0,038 -0,156 0,037 0,037 0,128
Extremadura 0,548 1,073 0,040 -0,012 0,093 -0,129 0,009 0,124
Galicia 0,948 0,804 0,238 -0,044 -0,119 0,003 0,041 0,108
Madrid 1,093 0,525 0,481 -0,041 -0,207 0,082 0,041 0,098
Murcia 0,729 0,674 0,460 -0,061 -0,088 -0,058 0,056 0,084
Navarre 1,188 0,755 0,190 -0,047 0,022 -0,113 0,044 0,121
Basque Country 1,086 0,675 0,214 -0,037 -0,137 0,028 0,035 0,122
La Rioja 1,466 0,870 0,091 -0,031 0,137 -0,205 0,029 0,133
Average 0,976 0,807 0,207 -0,035 -0,077 -0,026 0,033 0,117
Spain
1 1,066 -0,037 -0,143 0,063 0,035 0,127
Standard deviation
2 0,0200 0,0218 0,011 0,001 0,008 0,008 0,001 0,002
Notes: 
1The elasticities for Spain are obtained as weighted averages, taken as weights the ratios of the regional value of the variable to the national value.
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Figure 3.-Optimal and observed private capital stock.
Spain 1980-1993.
Given the previous results, it is also possible to reconsider the complementary
and/or substitutable relationship between public infrastructures and variable inputs.
Apart from the direct or short run effect dealt with in the preceding paragraphs, there
will be an indirect effect on the demand of variable inputs. This indirect effect may be
generated by the influence of public capital on the demand of private capital, which in
its turn would generate additional demand of the other inputs. As can be seen in column22
5, once we take into account both direct and indirect effects in the long run labor and
infrastructures are substitutes in all the Spanish regions (with four exceptions). The
most noticeable result is that in the five biggest regions (Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia,
Andalusia and Basque Country) the long run elasticity of labor to public capital is lower
than in the short run. The reason is that new infrastructures supplied by the public sector
in the long run will generate additional demand for private capital, which further
generates new demand for labor. Finally, in the long run intermediate inputs and public
capital are substitutes in eight regions and complements in the remaining nine, although
among the latter there are the biggest ones.
The last information displayed in table 6 refers to the output elasticities of
private and public capital (cols. 7 and 8). The average output elasticity of private capital
in the long run shows reasonable values around 0.12; being approximately four times
higher than the one corresponding to public capital (0.035). As can be appreciated the
elasticity of public capital to output is higher in the long run than in the short run, and
the regional pattern of these elasticities confirms previous findings about the regions
where infrastructures have the biggest productive effect. Nevertheless, given that in
general we have found a high rate of return to public infrastructures in Spain, it seems
reasonable to have an idea of their optimal level and where they should be located.
Throughout the paper we have considered public capital as an unpaid input for
the firms. However, to be more precise about the productive profitability of public
infrastructures we should compare the short run shadow price of infrastructures with
some measure of the social user cost of them. To do this we will use three different
measures of the social user cost of infrastructures. First, we consider a zero social cost
of public capital investment. Second, we use the user cost of public capital available on
our database
24, that has no variation across regions, given that the cost of opportunity
which the public sector faces when allocating money to infrastructures is the same no
matter what region the money goes. Third, we will consider as an upper bound to the
                                                          
24 The user cost of public infrastructures available in the BD.MORES database is negative until 1984,
while it is positive and grows steadily from 1985 to 1993. In real terms the regional average is 0,0576 if
we do not consider the first five years, while it is 0,0187 if we consider the complete time span. We will
not take into account the negative figures in our calculations.23
social cost of infrastructures the user cost of private capital for the whole Spanish
private productive sector.
In figure 4 we have depicted the time evolution of the stock of effective public
capital, as well as the optimal stock obtained by means of equation (11) under the
different assumptions about the social user cost. The initial endowment of
infrastructures in 1980 was clearly insufficient; no matter what users cost is used as
reference. Nevertheless, at the end of the sample period both the optimal and the
effective capital stocks have approached considerably
25, reflecting the enormous
investing effort carried out by the public sector in these years. Hence, investment in
public infrastructures has been very important, although it is still insufficient, if we take
into account that the regions that have more weight in total Spanish gross output have
the higher shadow prices of public capital in the long run.
With regard to the optimal placing of public infrastructures, the results across
regions obtained for the long run shadow price of public capital (col. 3 of table 6) show
that the most profitable regions are Madrid, Murcia, Baleares, Catalonia, Galicia,
Valencia and Basque Country. In figure 5 we have ordered the regions in terms of the
differences between the long run shadow price of public capital and the different user
cost measures. In almost every case, it would be efficient that the public sector provides
the regions with higher levels of public infrastructures. If we consider the upper bound
case (i.e. the user cost of private capital) there are four regions (Castile and Leon,
Castile-La Mancha, la Rioja and Extremadura) where the allocation of new
infrastructures would be not profitable. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that this
valuation of productive profitability of infrastructures responds only to efficiency
criteria, and ignores equity or welfare issues that the public sector should also take into
account.
                                                          
25 If we look at the optimal public stock obtained using the private user cost as reference, it is inclusively
lower than the effective one at the end of the sample period. Nevertheless, the utilization of the user cost
of private capital is just an upper bound, given that the rate of depreciation of public capital is lower than
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Figure 5.- Localization of infrastructures. Average values 1980-1993
                                                          
26 Optimal public capital stock, optimal public capital 1 and optimal public capital 2 denote the optimal
public capital levels computed under different assumptions about the user cost of public capital. First, we
assume a zero user cost of public capital; second, we consider the user cost of public capital in the BD.
MORES; and finally we use the user cost of private capital.25
5. Conclusions.
In this paper we have dealt with the effect of infrastructures on cost performance and
productivity of the private sector in the Spanish regions. Our choice has been a dual
approach based on cost functions, unlike the majority of studies on the Spanish regions
that estimate production functions. Using such an approach we are able to process more
information, although we can also recover the conventional parameters obtained from
the estimation of production functions. In addition, we also obtain at the regional level
cost-benefit measures and elasticities of the various productive inputs, as well as the
complementary and substitutable relationship among them. In our framework we allow
for the existence of quasi-fixed or external inputs, that may not be at their static
equilibrium levels.
The estimation of a Generalized Leontief Cost Function together with the
equations that derive from the theoretical restrictions imposed by Shephard’s Lemma,
allows us to test whether private factors are at their optimal demand levels. In this sense,
the tests statistics indicate clearly that labor and intermediate inputs are pure variable
inputs, while private capital is a quasi-fixed factor, that is away from its static
equilibrium level. This is an important result, since it is commonplace in the literature to
impose either that private capital is a variable or a quasi-fixed factor without any formal
econometric test that supports one or the other view. If common economic sense may be
sometimes enough to impose some theoretical restrictions in our case both aspects work
in the same way.
From the econometric analysis in previous pages it is possible to come to some
conclusions about the effects of public and private capital on the structure of costs and
productivity of the private sector in the Spanish regions along the 1980-93 period. In
relation to the shadow price or gross rate of return of both factors, it is worthwhile
mentioning that we have found positive and significant shadow prices of private capital
in all the regions. Further, the shadow price of private capital is higher than the user cost
in those regions that have more specific weight in Spanish total gross output throughout
the period. This means that the cost elasticity of private capital is negative in the
aforesaid regions and positive in the remainder, which implies also that the optimal
stock of private capital is above the effective one in these regions. In almost every26
region, investing in new units of private capital seems to contribute positively to job
creation and to a saving of intermediate inputs.
The general panorama seems to be different with regard to public infrastructures.
The shadow prices of public capital are positive and significant in all the Spanish
regions (with the outstanding exceptions of Castile and Leon and La Rioja).
Furthermore, unlike the average shadow price of private capital which shows a slight
upward trend, the average public capital shadow price shows a clear downward trend
throughout the period. This trend implies that the government has reduced, at least
partially, the shortage of infrastructures that the Spanish productive sector had at the
beginning of the eighties. Nevertheless, there is still margin for the public sector to
make further investing efforts, especially if we take into account that the long run
shadow prices of public capital (i.e. once private capital is at its optimal level) are still
positive and high in the most productive regions.
With regard to the complementary and substitutable relationships between
infrastructures and other inputs, in the short run the results are more heterogeneous than
in the case of private capital. Nevertheless, employment and infrastructures are
substitutes, and intermediate inputs and infrastructures are complements in the biggest
regions. However, if we take into account that the optimal stock of private capital
depends on the existing volume of public capital, it is also possible to study the
relationship between them. In our case we have found that both factors are
unambiguously complementary in all the Spanish regions (the average elasticity of
optimal private capital to infrastructures is 0,81). In other words, infrastructures
generate a significant positive impact on the shadow price of private capital, favoring its
accumulation in the long run.27
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Appendix
Table A.1. Estimated structural coeffiecients.
Parameter Coefficient t-ratio Parameter Coefficient t-ratio
α 11 -0,359 -5,273  γ 1tP -0,052 -5,372
α 12  0,119  5,606 γ 1YG -0,3 10
3 -6,097
α 22  1,090  14,70 γ 1tG  0,038  1,954
δ 1Y  0,2 10
3  7,988 γ 2YP -0,9 10
4 -2,084
δ 2Y -0,1 10
3 -3,381  γ 2tP  0,010  0,888
δ 1t  0,003  0,270 γ 2YG  0,6 10
3  10,53
δ 2t  0,021  1,448 γ 2tG -0,091 -3,464
γ 1yy -0,3 10
7 -7,494 γ 1PG 0,313  3,911
γ 1yt  0,5 10
5  3,338  γ 1PP -0,526 -12,82
γ 1tt -0,7 10
3 -0,415 γ 1GG  0,316  1,554
γ 2YY  0,5 10
8  1,054 γ 2PG -1,107 -12,87
γ 2Yt -0,1 10
4 -5,744  γ 2PP  0,926  22,57
γ 2tt  0,003  1,708 γ 2GG  1,481  6,372
 δ 1P  1,130  12,459 D1α 11  0,005  1,930
 δ 1G -0,769 -6,299 D1α 22 -0,006 -2,616
 δ 2P -1,203 -11,77 D2α 11 -0,010 -2,940
 δ 2G  0,373  2,555 D2α 22  0,040  13,22
γ 1YP -0,6 10
4 -1,727
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Schankerman and Nadiri test χ
2 (10) = 8186,438 (P-Value = 0,00000)
Shephard Lemma test χ
2 (36) = 22,9628 (P-Value = 0,95482)
Test of the Curvature condition for K
*
P: γ 1PP + γ 2PP = 0,40 χ
2 (1) = 3,7482 (P-Value = 0,05286)
Nº Obs.  238